Towards a New Phase of Du Châtelet Scholarship: from Institutions de Physique (1740) to Institutions Physiques (1742)
There is a mysterious two-fold change in Du Châtelet’s position on Newtonian attraction: from acceptance thereof as an explanatory principle inEssai sur L’Optique(ca. 1938-1939), to rejection in the 1740 Institutions, and returning to acceptance again in her Commentary (1756) to Newton’s Principia. In this paper, I suggest that we turn to the 1742 Institutions for answers. There, Du Châtelet introduces physical explanation and maintains that we can appeal to certain physical qualities (such as attraction) for explanatory force. Using this case study, I arguein this paper that the scholarship will benefit greatly from turning to the 1742 edition going forward.
Euler against Newtonian Gravity: “A Crude Hypothesis”?
Euler is well known for his contribution to the founding and development of what we nowadays call Newtonian mechanics, but you might be surprised to know that he was not very happy with Newton’s way of conceiving gravity. In a 1751 letter to Tobias Mayer, he even dismissed Newton’s derivation of the law of gravity as “founded on a crude hypothesis”. Which hypothesis? Why crude? Was he being fair to Newton? If you, like me, are interested in learning more about Euler’s bitter complaint, check out this paper!
An expanded version of this paper is now in the process of revision and resubmission to Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. Please email me if you are interested in reading that version.
Du Châtelet on relative and absolute motion [with Katherine Brading]
Absolute motion and absolute place are typically defined in terms of absolute space. Strangely, Du Châtelet defined absolute motion and absolute location in relation to “the entire universe considered as at rest”. Is she simply confused about the absolute/relative distinction that Newton drew, which he thought was key to theorizing about the true motion? Check out our paper to see why her confusion is only apparent — what she offered is in fact a compelling response to the metaphysical, conceptual, and epistemic challenges posed by Newton’s project in the Principia.
